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The ͚ontological politics of drug policy͛: a critical realist approach 
 
A paper for presentation at the 13th annual conference of the International Society for the Study of 
Drug Policy, Paris, May 2019 
 






This paper explores the question of what we can consider to be real in drug policy. It examines two 
common approaches in drug policy analysis (and criminology more broadly); radical constructionist 
critique and successionist data science. It shows how researchers using both approaches have 
produced valuable findings, but also demonstrates the theoretical incoherence of their ontological 
assumptions, ďased oŶ theiƌ shaƌed ͚flat oŶtologǇ͛. The radical constructionist detachment of 
knowledge from an independently existing reality – seen in some qualitative studies - is shown to be 
unsustainably self-defeating. As acknowledged by Annemaƌie Mol, it is aŶalǇtiĐallǇ ͚paƌalǇziŶg͛. This 
leads to two common inconsistencies in radical constructionist studies; crypto-empiricism and ersatz 
epistemic egalitarianism. The Humean successionist approach of econometric data science is also 
shown to be unsustainable and unable to provide explanations of identified patterns in data. Four 
consequent, limiting characteristics of this type of research are discussed: causal inference at a 
distance, monofinality, limited causal imagination, and overly confident causal claims. The paper 
goes on to describe and exemplify a critical realist ontology for drug policy analysis based on Roy 
Bhakƌa͛s Realist Theory of Science. The ͚depth oŶtologǇ͛ of this approach enables more deeply 
explanatory, methodologically eclectic and democratically inclusive analysis of drug policy 




Theory matters. As drug policy researchers, we base our work on assumptions about what the world 
in which drug policies operate is. And so we must consider ontology. The importance of this topic 
was raised in an article – which led to a presentation at the ISSDP conference in Ghent in 2015 - on 
the ͚oŶtologiĐal politiĐs͛ of drug policy. With this phrase, Robin Dwyer and David Moore refer to the 
processes through which ͚the ͞real͟ is made more or less possible, more or less probable, more or 
less ƌeal͛ (Dwyer & Moore, 2013, p. 205). The question at the heart of this paper, then, is what can 
we consider to be real in drug policy? The reason this is a political question is that how we answer it 
will at least partly depend on – and will go on to affect - distributions of power, partly by affecting 
who gets to have a say on drug policy. It is a vital question for drug policy analysis and is also 
relevant for its contributory disciplines, including sociology, economics, politics, psychology, 
anthropology, law and their hybrid criminological offspring. 
 
I will consider two potential answers to the question of reality. They are given by two approaches 
that are frequently represented at this conference. I will refer to them as radical constructionist 
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critique and successionist data science. The first is characterised by a profound scepticism as to the 
possibility of grounding knowledge in an external reality. The second by a belief that real causes can 
be identified directly from patterns in data. Consideration of the methodological strengths and 
ontological weaknesses of these approaches will lead to a description of a critical approach to drug 
policy which is both anti-foundationalist and realist; a critical realist ontology of drug policy. 
 
The analytical paralysis of radical constructionist ontology in drug policy research 
 
AŶ iŶĐƌeasiŶg ďodǇ of ƌeseaƌĐh oŶ dƌug poliĐǇ ͚eǆploƌes the ǁaǇ poliĐǇ pƌoďleŵs aƌe ĐoŶstƌuĐted, 
aŶd ageŶdas aƌe set aŶd deliŶeated ďǇ doŵiŶaŶt fƌaŵes aŶd Ŷaƌƌatiǀes͛ (Gstrein, 2018, p. 75). This 
research spans the range of post-structuralist approaches, including Foucauldian discourse analysis, 
the actor network theory of science and technology studies, and some interpretations of post-
humanist, Deleuzian, new materialism. The great value of constructionist approaches is that they 
remind us of the contingency of knowledge. However, this epistemological advantage can be 
obliterated by taking an ontological position that denies the very possibility of knowledge. This is 
because radical constructionism suggests that nothing exists outside discourse. So it denies the 
independent existences of the essential referent of knowledge; reality. 
 
People hold knowledge about drug policy that takes many different forms and has various contents. 
Their knowledge is contingent on the point they occupy in space and time, as well as their 
disciplinary training. The Ŷatuƌe of the ͚dƌug pƌoďleŵ͛ itself is Ŷot aŶ iŶdepeŶdeŶtlǇ giǀeŶ, 
DurkheiŵiaŶ ͚soĐial fact͛. DǁǇeƌ aŶd Mooƌe͛s (2013) study showed, for example, the ways in which 
different knowledges on methamphetamine have been constructed in Australia. Valuable research 
has also ďeeŶ doŶe oŶ the ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ of the ͚pƌoďleŵ͛ of crack (e.g. Hartman & Golub, 1999; 
Reinarman & Levine, 1997), of heroin (e.g. Carnwath & Smith, 2002) and of cannabis (e.g. Acevedo, 
2007). Addiction has been analysed as a social construct (Keane, 2002; Moore & Fraser, 2013; 
Reinarman, 2005), as has drug treatment (valentine, 2009), and the very concept upon which we 
base our nascent field; the category of ͚dƌugs͛ (Race, 2013; Seddon, 2010). 
 
Responses to drug problems are not naturally occurring, inevitable consequences of neutrally 
scientific and rational deliberation. They are products of social (and – in post-humanist accounts - 
material) processes. ͚“olutioŶs͛ to dƌug pƌoďleŵs are constructed through discourses, which are the 
sets of words, images and symbols which form drug policy. We can learn valuable lessons by 
studying how these discourses operate. We can, for example, examine the ways in which the 
concept of ͚ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ͛ ǁas diffeƌeŶtlǇ ĐoŶstƌuĐted aŶd received in the UK and Australia (Lancaster, 
Duke, & Ritter, 2015). This helps us explain why the notion was taken more fully into policy in the 
UK, producing the situation where harm reduction came to be seen by some English treatment 
professionals as out-dated (Dennis, 2016), and where people in treatment are pushed to reduce and 
end opioid substitution prescriptions before they are ready (Floodgate, 2017). The social 
construction of drug policy has real effects. 
 
But in order to see the value of this knowledge, we need a conceptual framework which allows for 
the possibility that real effects actually exist. The Đlaiŵ that ͚sĐieŶtifiĐ pƌoĐesses pƌoduĐe theiƌ 
oďjeĐts͛ (Moore, 2011, p. 82) cannot provide a sound basis for analysis. If knowledge claims are 
entirely constructed and there are no criteria for judging them that are external to the process of 
construction - ďeĐause ͚the realities of drug use and addiction do not pre-exist our attempts to know 
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theŵ͛ (Dilkes-Frayne, 2018, p. 1548) - then how are we to assess which knowledge we should use as 
a basis for action in drug policy? 
 
This problem was recognised by one of the authors whom Dwyer and Moore (2013) referenced as 
the source of their discussion of ontological politics. They quoted the work of Annemarie Mol, and in 
paƌtiĐulaƌ heƌ Đlaiŵ that ͚ƌealitǇ does Ŷot pƌeĐede the ŵuŶdaŶe pƌaĐtiĐes iŶ ǁhiĐh ǁe iŶteƌaĐt ǁith 
it, ďut is ƌatheƌ shaped ǁithiŶ these pƌaĐtiĐes͛ (Mol, 1999, p. 75). The logical implication of this claim 
is that there is no basis for thinking that one form of knowledge is superior to another, because 
knowledge is interior to our methods of knowing, rather than being related to a reality that lies 
outside these methods. In her study of medical practice, Mol (2002, p. 154) acknowledged that this 
detachment of knowledge from an external ƌefeƌeŶt is ͚paƌalǇziŶg͛. It ŵakes it iŵpossiďle foƌ studies 
of sĐieŶĐe to aŶsǁeƌ the ƋuestioŶ of ͚ǁhat ŵakes sĐieŶĐe studies ďetteƌ thaŶ the self-interpretation 
of sĐieŶtists, oƌ laǇ opiŶioŶ? What aƌe the gƌouŶds foƌ its oǁŶ Đlaiŵs to eǆpeƌtise?͛ ;Iďid, p.ϭϱϱͿ. AŶd 
here it the heart of the problem with radical constructionism. It is self-contradictory. Its maxims do 
not survive being applied to themselves. It claims an expertise which advances knowledge, while 
stating that there are no external criteria for preferring this form of knowledge over any other. If we 
choose completely to ignore radical constructionist critique, how could a radical constructionist 
argue that we should not do so? 
 
This self-contradiction leads to two common inconsistencies in contemporary qualitative drug policy 
research; crypto-empiricism and ersatz epistemic egalitarianism. 
 
Crypto-empiricism involved professing a radical constructionist approach while establishing claims to 
kŶoǁledge oŶ aŶ eǆteƌŶallǇ aǀailaďle ƌealitǇ. Let͛s ĐoŶsidet the ƌadiĐal ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶist pƌoposal that 
accounts are not to be judged on the basis of their correspondence to a reality that is external to 
representations of it. Contrast this with a common research method of radical constructionist 
critique, as used by Dwyer and Moore (2013); the gathering of data on discourses presented in 
interviews, media articles and other texts. Now let͛s iŵagiŶe that a critic of such a study (we might 
call them revewer #2) makes a nonsensical, non-empirical claim that these texts do not actually 
exist. If a radical constructionist wished to rebut reviewer #2 and sustain the claims which they use 
these data to develop,  how could they possibly do so except by reference to a reality that is external 
to their own account of it; by insisting that these texts actually precede accounts of them?  
 
Words that are written or spoken may be produced on the basis of pre-existing discourses which are 
open to multiple interpretations. But once they have been stated, they have an actual existence 
which is separate from accounts of them. If we wish to analyse the discourse of Donald Trump or 
Theresa May on drug policy, it is important that we can agree on what words they have actually 
spoken. Aƌe ǁe to take PƌesideŶt Tƌuŵp͛s deŶials of his oǁŶ ǁoƌds aŶd deeds to ďe eƋuallǇ ǀalid to 
contemporaneously recorded, multipy corroborating accounts of what he actually said and did?1  
 
Such a position would express an extreme form of epistemic egalitarianism. This is the claim that no 
particular way of representing what occus in the world is superior to another. Ersatz epistemic 
egalitarianism involves professing to hold this belief while creating accounts of the world that are 
                                                          
1 See for example, the exasperation of BBC correspondent Jon Sopel at the repetition of President Truŵp͛s 
claim to have predicted Brexit in advance during a visit to Scotland. He actually did not arrive in Scotland until 
after the referendum result was declared: https://twitter.com/BBCJonSopel/status/1106250915739324416 
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self-evidently presented as being superior to others.2 For example, Dwyer and Moore (2013, p.210) 
stated they did not intend to offer a ͚͟better͟ ǀeƌsioŶ of methamphetamine͛. But a few sentences 
later, they called for accounts that are ͚less alaƌŵist͛ aŶd ͚ŵoƌe ŶuaŶĐed͛. Can it really be contended 
that such accounts were not intended to be better than the discourses that Dwyer and Moore 
criticically analysed? An account which is more nuanced can hardly be intended to be worse, or even 
equal. An accusation of alarmism only makes sense if it alleges misrepresentation, not just different 
representation. 
 
In forging on past her acknowledgement of the paralysis of radical constructionism, Mol (2002) 
argued that we must move beyond judging accounts on the basis of a correspondence theory of 
truth. For her, judgements between claims are to be made on normative rather than empirical 
grounds.3 The problem here is that radical constructionism is also ͚ĐƌǇpto-Ŷoƌŵatiǀe͛ (Sayer, 2012). It 
takes a critical normative stance while having no grounds on which to base that stance. It sees norms 
as well as knowledge to be both multiple and incommensurable. The materialist realist, Manuel 
DeLanda (2006, p.195), argued that this kind of relativism is ͚at odds͛ ǁith ͚our ethico-political 
ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts to iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶ͛. BǇ takiŶg aǁaǇ the possiďilitǇ to aƌgue ƌatioŶallǇ foƌ the supeƌioƌitǇ 
of any account, radical constructionism weakens our ability to resist the authoritarian imposition of 
knowledge and values (Latour, 2004; Sismondo, 2017).  
 
In principle, if not in practice, radical constructionism abandons the attempt to ground knowledge 
claims on correspondence with an external reality. Some of its exponents then argue (self-
defeatingly) that we can judge between knowledge claims on normative grounds, but that there is 
no extra-discursive basis on which to ground these judgements. If we combine these claims with the 
Foucauldian assumption that knowledge and norms are decided on the basis of ͚ĐeŶtƌalising power͛ 
(Lancaster, Seear, Treloar, & Ritter, 2017, p. 71), then whom do we expect to prevail when 
knowledge is contested (as it very often is in drug policy)? Will it be those who value equality, 
compassion and mutual tolerance? Or those who value struggle, conformity and domination? 
Without a commitment to verisimilitude in our accounts of social processes, we are left in a world of 
pure rhetoric, pray to abuses of power with no basis for contesting them, except our own ignorable 
normative preferences.  
 
Successionist causal ontology in drug policy data science 
 
The conventional quantitative methods adopted by data science involve a fundamentally Humean, 
successionist view of causation. Hume (1758, p. 371) ǁƌote, ͚ǁe haǀe Ŷo otheƌ idea of this ƌelatioŶ 
[of ĐausatioŶ] thaŶ that of tǁo oďjeĐts, ǁhiĐh haǀe ďeeŶ fƌeƋueŶtlǇ ĐoŶjoiŶed͛. Huŵe͛s constant 
conjunctions are the regularities for which data scientists search. He ruled out the attempt to create 
ideas aďout these ĐoŶjuŶĐtioŶs, seeiŶg this as ͚ŵetaphǇsiĐal͛ speĐulatioŶ, ǁhiĐh should ďe 
committed ͚to the flames͛ (Hume, 1772).  
 
                                                          
2 I use the German word ͚ersatz͛ here because its usage in English denotes a substitute for a real thing that 
ĐaŶŶot ďe used. The EŶglish eƋuiǀaleŶt ͚fake͛ suggests aŶ iŶteŶtioŶ to deĐeiǀe, ǁhiĐh I do Ŷot suggest heƌe. 
Rather, I am suggesting that strict epistemic egalitarianism is not actually available for use by anyone who is 
proposing an account which they hope to be persuasive.  
3 This is the saŵe aŶsǁeƌ that Daǀid Mooƌe gaǀe ŵe ǁheŶ I asked Mol͛s ͚paƌalǇziŶg͛ ƋuestioŶ afteƌ he 
presented the methamphetamine discourse analysis at our conference in Ghent. 
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Interesting studies have identified regular successions from providing drug treatment to fewer 
crimes (Bondurant, Lindo, & Swensen, 2018; NTA, 2012), from relatively loose availability of medical 
marijuana to fewer opioid deaths (Powell, Pacula, & Jacobson, 2018), from the control of precursor 
chemicals to reductions in cocaine availability (Cunningham, Callaghan, & Liu, 2015),  from various 
forms of drug law enforcement to various forms of harm (DeBeck et al., 2017; Werb et al., 2011), 
and from lax regulatory environments to increased use of alcohol (Babor et al., 2010). These studies 
are based on the notion that an independent variable X exerts an external causal effect on the 
dependent variable Y.  
 
Just as critical studies in drug policy cannot sustain a thorough-going radical constructionism and so 
employ empirical justifications for the superiority of their accounts, so data scientists do not always 
adhere to a strictly Humean, eŵpiƌiĐist sepaƌatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚ŵatteƌs of faĐt͛ aŶd ͚ƌelatioŶs of ideas͛. 
Even Hume himself could not refrain from theoretical conjecture when attempting to explain why 
expected regularities may not occur (Bhaskar, 1975, p. 41). 
 
As Huŵe͛s self-contradictory forays into ͚metaphysical͛ speculation suggest, regular successions are 
not the only thing we need to know about causation. The great problem with the Humean approach 
to causation is that it is essentially tautological. It tell us nothing about causes that is not inherent to 
its definitions of a cause. To suggest a relationship is causal if there is constant conjunction, 
precedence and necessity in the relationship between Xs and Ys does not answer the explanatory 
question of why Ys occur in conjunction with Xs. Relations of causality cannot simply be read off 
from the common co-occurrence of two abstracted variables (Sayer, 2000), however complex the 
statistical model, and however tightly it fits the data. Causes are not to be found at the surface of 
social systems, in the ĐoiŶĐideŶĐe of the ͚ǀaƌiate tƌaĐes͛ that we produce in measurements of actual 
cases (Byrne, 2011). In order to explain social processes, we need to identify causal mechanisms, not 
statistical regularities.  
 
This better view of causation presents a fundamental challenge to both experimental and causal 
inferential methods in data science (Pawson & Tilley, 1998). Experimental methods are not often 
used in drug policy analysis, as it is difficult to randomise cases to different drug policy conditions. 
Data scientists have displayed a great deal of methodological imagination in creating ways to draw 
causal inferences from non-experimental data. These are usually based on the template of linear 
regressions analysis, with additional components to reduce the possibility of error in the 
identification of successionist effects. So we increasingly see the application of propensity score 
matching, regression discontinuity, difference-in-difference, event study design and instrumental 
variable approaches in studies of drug policy. The common feature here is the attempt to isolate the 
succession from X to Y from all the other conjunctions that may confound our view of it. So these 
studies eǆpƌess the hope that ͚if huŵaŶ ďehaǀiouƌ ǁeƌe suďjeĐt to eǆpeƌiŵental closure [by 
eǆĐludiŶg the iŶflueŶĐe of all otheƌ ǀaƌiaďles], ǁe Đould oďseƌǀe Đausal laǁs at ǁoƌk͛ (Cruickshank, 
2003, p. 46).  
 
These types of studies have the potential to add greatly to our knowledge by indicating where to 
look for causal processes. But in reading many of them, I have identified four common, related 
characteristics that may reduce their usefulness. They may even produce knowledge that is 
dangerously wrong. These characteristics are observed in the methods by which some data scientists 
establish and report causal claims in drug policy analysis. But they originate in a particular, Humean 
view of the nature of causation. So they are not only epistemological concerns, relating to how best 
we can know the world. They are also ontological. They represent a particular view on what the 
world is. These four characteristics are: 
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 Causal inference at a distance. From a realist perspective, an important step in studying 
causal processes is the collection of evidence that the proposed mechanism actually exists 
(Rogeberg & Melberg, 2011). It is not enough just to find that patterns in data are consistent 
with a theorised mechanism existing. They might be consistent with many other possible 
mechanisms. If the causal mechanism is not observed in action, then it cannot be known 
that it is that mechanism which actually is in operation. For example, we might have an idea 
that changing penalties for drug possession can affect drug-related harms by affecting levels 
of drug use. But to know whether this particular causal process is in action, we would need 
to use data on levels of drug use, not just a regular conjunction between changes in 
penalties and indicators of harms. Purely successionist studies omit this crucial step. We can 
call this ͚causal inference at a distance͛ because it ignores the need to develop an intimate, 
up-close knowledge of the mechanisms involved in producing the outcomes of drug policy.  
  Monofinality. MaŶǇ suĐĐessioŶist studies ideŶtifǇ oŶe ͚Đausal ƌeĐipe͛ ;ofteŶ iŶ the foƌŵ of a 
regression equation) as the best representation of the analysed data. These methods are 
therefore monofinal, even if they include more than one variable and so are not 
ŵoŶoĐausal. The teƌŵ ͚ŵoŶofiŶalitǇ͛ shoǁs the ĐoŶtƌast ďetǁeeŶ ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶal ƋuaŶtitatiǀe 
methods and qualitative comparative analysis. QCA assumes equifinality. Different 
combinations of causes can lead to the same outcome (Ragin, 2008).4 The introduction of 
interaction terms into regression equations goes some way to acknowledging this contingent 
complexity. But it is vanishingly rare for drug policy studies to examine more than one or 
two first order interactions. Many other potential combinations usually exist. 
  Limited causal imagination. We observe limited causal imagination when hypothesised 
causal mechanisms are based on only one type of theory. Economic studies, for example, 
often only base causal ideas on the ͚ĐoŵpletelǇ iŵpoǀeƌished͛ ǀieǁ of huŵaŶ ŵotiǀatioŶ as 
being reducible to instrumental, self-interested, rational choice (Archer, 2003). This 
perspective is the basis of rational addiction theory (Becker & Murphy, 1988). Nobody can 
deny a role for rationality in human decision making without contradicting themselves (if 
rationality has no role, why bother justifying assertions in arguments?). But rational 
addiction theory fails accurately to predict the behaviour of people who use drugs, partly 
because it ignores genetic, neurological and sociological processes (Bretteville-Jensen, 1999; 
Rogeberg, 2004; Stevens, 2011; Vale, 2010).5  
  Overly confident causal claims. It is common for drug policy researchers to find correlational 
associations; far rarer for them to find strong, direct evidence of causality. Nevertheless, 
strong claims are often made. Every time an abstract or conclusion slips from reporting a 
                                                          
4 For example, deĐƌiŵiŶalisatioŶ of dƌug possessioŶ ŵaǇ oĐĐuƌ ďeĐause of the ͚ŵoƌal dissoŶaŶĐe͛ ďetǁeeŶ high 
rates of drug use and legal prohibition, as has been suggested as an explanation for decriminalisation of 
cannabis in several US states (Lempert, 2010). But it may also occur in response to concerns over the social 
integration of people with drug problems, as in Portugal in 2001 (Hughes & Stevens, 2010), due to a political 
rejection of soviet-style state oppression, as in Czechoslovakia in 1990 (Zábranský, 2004), or as an 
unanticipated result of a constitutional court decision, as in Germany in 1994 (Bollinger, 2004). 
5 ‘atioŶal addiĐtioŶ theoƌǇ ͚illustƌate hoǁ aďsuƌd ĐhoiĐe theoƌies iŶ eĐoŶoŵiĐs get takeŶ seƌiouslǇ as possiďlǇ 
true explanations and tools for welfare analysis despite being poorly interpreted, empirically unfalsifiable, and 
ďased oŶ ǁildlǇ iŶaĐĐuƌate assuŵptioŶs͛ (Rogeberg, 2004, p. 263). 
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statistical assoĐiatioŶ to statiŶg that oŶe ǀaƌiaďle ͚iŶĐƌeased͛, ͚ƌeduĐed͛, ͚liŵited͛, ͚iŵpaĐted͛, 
͚iŶduĐed͛ oƌ ͚geŶeƌated͛ aŶotheƌ, a stƌoŶg causal claim is being made.  
In contrast to radical constructionists, data scientists would not be contradicting themselves by 
asking for empirical evidence that these four inconsistencies actually exist. And there is plenty of 
evidence to choose from. For example, Rogeberg and Melberg (2011) surveyed 64 researchers who 
published studies using rational addiction theory. They found that the majority of these researchers 
accepted the claims that such research Đould pƌoǀide ͚Đausal iŶsight͛ ǁithout oďseƌǀiŶg Đausal 
processes. In other words, they supported what I have called causal inference at a distance. 
Rogeberg and Melberg argued these researchers did Ŷot ŵeet the thƌeshold of ďeiŶg eǀeŶ ͚ĐƌudelǇ 
ƌatioŶal͛. Such remote causal inference is not rational from the realist perspective which Rogeberg 
and Melberg adopt. But it is entirely consistent for a Humean ontologist to deny the need for any 
other information than the contiguity in the observed relation between X and Y. This is the 
successionist approach which is often used in data science, even though – as discussed above – it is 
tautological and unsustainable in practice. 
 
Figure 1: CoŵŵoŶ ĐharaĐteristiĐs of suĐĐessioŶist data sĐieŶĐe iŶ studies Đited ďy DoleaĐ et al’s 
(2018) Research Roundup on reducing opioid use and deaths (black cells represent the presence of 
the characteristic) 
Study Causal inference 
at a distance
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A recent reǀieǁ aiŵed to ͚highlight studies that measure the causal effect of recent policies on 
opioid aďuse aŶd ŵoƌtalitǇ͛ (Doleac, Mukherjee, & Schnell, 2018, emphasis in original). It provided 
many examples of the four characteristics of successionist data science. It cited 28 studies (listed in 
Figure 1) that reported on the effect of an intervention or programme. Reading these studies, 18 did 
not include observations of a posited causal process, and so display causal inference at a distance. 
Twenty-two expressed this causal process in one additive equation (with no interaction terms) and 
so displayed monofinality. Nine did not provide a theoretical explanation for the link they investigate 
between intervention and outcome, offering a purely successionist concept of causation. Of the 19 
that did provide a causal explanation or theory, six based their causal imagination on the limiting 
perspectives of instrumental rational action theory. And 15 present their primary finding as a strong 
causal claims on the basis of observed associations. Even an article that stated that drawing causal 
iŶfeƌeŶĐe fƌoŵ suĐh assoĐiatioŶs ƌelies oŶ ͚fuŶdaŵeŶtallǇ uŶtestaďle assuŵptioŶs͛ still ŵade the 
stƌoŶg Đausal Đlaiŵ that ͚suďstaŶĐe-abuse-treatment facilities reduce both violent and financially 
ŵotiǀated Đƌiŵes iŶ aŶ aƌea͛ (Bondurant et al., 2018). 6  
 
The increasing sophistication of the methods used in data science provide increasingly specific clues 
on where to look for causes. But successionist studies that assume rather than demonstrating 
particular causal processes may lead us astray. To understand the causal processes that operate in 
drug policy, we need a different approach. 
 




In his Realist Theory of Science, Roy Bhaskar (1975) presented a nested model of reality. His three 
doŵaiŶs of ƌealitǇ fit togetheƌ like a ‘ussiaŶ doll, ǁith the doŵaiŶ of the ͚eŵpiƌiĐal͛ ďeiŶg iŶside the 
doŵaiŶ of the ͚aĐtual͛, ǁhiĐh is iŶside the doŵaiŶ of the ͚ƌeal͛ ;see Figuƌe ϮͿ. The effects of real 
causal processes are the actual events which we observe empirically. Bhaskar argued that we can 
only assume that causal mechanisms operate when we are not observing them if we assume that 
these mechanisms are independent of the events they generate. Similarly, we can only make sense 
of ouƌ peƌĐeptioŶs of these eǀeŶts if ǁe assuŵe that theǇ oĐĐuƌ ͚iŶdepeŶdeŶtlǇ of eǆpeƌieŶĐe͛. 
͚“tƌuĐtuƌes aŶd ŵeĐhaŶisŵs theŶ aƌe ƌeal [doŵaiŶ of real] and distinct from the patterns of 
events [domain of actual] that they generate; just as events are real and distinct from the 
experiences in which they are apprehended [domain of empirical]͛ ;Bhaskaƌ, ϭ9ϳϱ, p.ϱϲͿ. 
 
Critical realist ontology therefore differs from the ontological positions of both strictly successionist 
data science and radical constructionist critique.7 It sees both as operating at the level of the 
empirical, so obscuring our view of the deeper level that we need to know about in order to 
understand drug policy and its effects; the level of the real. This is why critical realists accuse both 
suĐĐessioŶists aŶd ƌadiĐal ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶists of usiŶg a ͚flat͛ oŶtologǇ. We pƌefeƌ a ͚depth͛ oŶtologǇ. 
                                                          
6 DoleaĐ aŶd Mukheƌjee͛s (2018) ĐoŶtƌoǀeƌsial ǁoƌkiŶg papeƌ oŶ the ͚ŵoƌal hazaƌd͛ of ŶaloǆoŶe displaǇed all 
fouƌ of these ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs. It ŵade the stƌoŶg Đausal Đlaiŵ that ͚broadening naloxone access increased 
opioid-related mortality by 14%͛ iŶ the ŵid-west region of the USA. Later scrutiny showed this result to be 
highly sensitive to the specification of the regression discontinuity (Border, 2018). 
7 Although it is possible to present Deleuze as a particularly obfuscatory kind of critical realist (Rutzou, 2017). 
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We seek out the causal powers and properties which underlie the events which we observe 
(Pawson, 2000). 
 




IŶ ƌadiĐal ĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶist studies, flat oŶtologǇ aĐĐoŵpaŶies the paƌalǇsiŶg deŶial of the ͚ŵiŶd-
iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe͛ of aĐtual ƌealitǇ (DeLanda, 2006). In data science, flat ontology merges the empirical 
with the actual. So it may account for the common econometric use of data that does not accurately 
reflect hypothesised causal processes (Young, 2004). For example, some studies in drug policy have 
mistakenly used the dates of changes in legislation to indicate changes in the availability of naloxone 
or of medical cannabis, rather than using more direct measurements of the actual availability of 
these substances to their users (Kilmer & Pacula, 2017; Frank, Humphreys, & Pollack, 2018). Practice 
often lags behind the law. 
 
Empirical data are related to but separate from actual events and from the real causal mechanisms 
that produce these events. We need to use data carefully to produce (inductively) and test 
(deductively) ideas about how events are generated. What aƌe the ŵeĐhaŶisŵs that pƌoduĐe ͚demi-
ƌegulaƌities͛ (Lawson, 1997) in the social world, and how are they activated? In order to improve 
drug policy analysis, we need continually to gather qualitative and quantitative data on events and 
their meanings, to develop ideas on how these are generated, and to test these ideas to produce 
more nuanced and accurate understandings of the structures and mechanisms that generate drug 
policy and its outcomes. This is a ͚pƌocess-in-ŵotioŶ͛ that has ͚Ŷo foƌeseeaďle eŶd͛ ;Bhaskaƌ, ϭ9ϳϱ, 




The task of drug policy analysis is therefore to move us towards such deeper understandings of the 
real structures and mechanisms that generate the phenomena we observe. This can partly be done 
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by developing more sophisticated causal models. For example, a recent study by Otten et al (2018) 
provides a model that includes various intervening, empirically observed steps between early 
childhood stress and early adolescent substance use (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Findings from an ecological model for early adolescent substance use (reproduced from 




By taking us through the sequence from childƌeŶ͛s life experiences at ages 2 to 5, to problems in 
inhibitory control at ages 7 and 8, to deviance at ages 9 and 10, Otten et al provide a better 
understanding of how some children come to use substances at age 14. But theirs is still a 
successionist approach, ďased oŶ the ͚omnipresent Đausal aƌƌoǁ͛ from X to Y (Pawson, 2008, p. 3). 
To inform a critical realist understanding of the causation of early substance use, we need to go 
deeper. Each of these steps in the sequence needs to be accompanied by an idea of why one set of 
events might lead to the next. Critical realists also retain a critical distance from teƌŵs like ͚iŶhiďitoƌǇ 
ĐoŶtƌol͛ aŶd ͚deǀiaŶĐe͛, in line with our qualified social constructionism. These variables represent 
socially constructed categories in the domain of the empirical, created in part by the scales that are 
used to measure them. They are the socially shaped variate traces of the actual behaviours of the 
children included in the study. 
 
I noted above that successionist studies assume that X has an effect on Y, with no necessity to 
explain why this occurs. This involves the assumption that the effect of X is independent of the 
context in which it operates, so its effect is external to the system. In contrast, critical realists look 
for causal mechanisms that are internal to systems. IŶ soĐial sǇsteŵs, it ƌeĐogŶises that ͚people 
ŵake thiŶgs happeŶ͛ aŶd so eǆaŵiŶes the ƌeasoŶiŶg aŶd ĐapaĐities that people deploǇ (Pawson, 
2008). We therefore must not stop at identifying successions between events. We must study the 
conscious and unconscious decision-making of both the people who use drugs, and of the people 
ǁho ŵake poliĐǇ aďout theŵ. We ĐaŶ, foƌ eǆaŵple, usefullǇ suppleŵeŶt OtteŶ et al͛s Đausal ŵodel 
with information from qualitative research on parental experiences of adverse childhood 
eǆpeƌieŶĐes, aŶd of hoǁ to iŶĐƌease ĐhildƌeŶ͛s ƌesilieŶĐe to theŵ (Woods-Jaeger, Cho, Sexton, 




The move to generative explanation will therefore be a collective endeavour, undertaken by 
disparate researchers across many disciplines. Part of the point in following established conventions 
for the communication of research findings is to enable the cumulation of this knowledge. Some 
processes for cumulation – such as systematic reviews and meta-analyses – limit their selection of 
studies in order to produce a more rigorous account of observed successions. This has the 
disadvantage of excluding knowledge that could be very useful in producing and testing ideas on 
how drug policy interventions produce outcomes. The review by Doleac et al (2018), for example, 
would benefit greatly from the inclusion of evidence from observational and qualitative studies on 
how and why people use naloxone, needle exchanges and other harm reduction measures to reduce 
risks of drug use (e.g. Boucher et al., 2017; Marshall, Dechman, Minichiello, Alcock, & Harris, 2015; 




There is a method which has been specifically developed for the cumulation of knowledge that 
suppoƌts the ͚pƌoĐess-in-ŵotioŶ͛ of ĐƌitiĐal ƌealisŵ ďǇ deǀelopiŶg and testing ideas on the complex, 
contingent generation of outcomes. This is the realist review (Pawson, Greenhalgh, Harvey, & 
Walshe, 2005). Its aiŵ is to deǀelop a ͚pƌogƌaŵŵe theoƌǇ͛, which is ͚aŶ aďstƌaĐted desĐƌiptioŶ 
and/or diagram that lays out what a program (or family of programs or intervention) comprises and 
hoǁ it is eǆpeĐted to ǁoƌk͛ (Wong, Westhorp, Pawson, & Greenhalgh, 2013, p. 24). An example is 
provided below as Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: A realist programme theory of contexts, mechanisms and outcomes of alternative 
measures for dealing with drugs possession (reproduced from Stevens et al, under review) 
 
 
Figure 4 presents a programme theory of alternatives to criminalisation for simple possession of 
drugs (Stevens, Hughes, Hulme, & Cassidy, under review). We developed it through a realist review 
of these approaches in nine selected countries (Australia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, 
Jamaica, Netherland, Portugal, UK, USA) which we carried out for the Irish government. The article in 
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which this diagram is presented provides more detail on the three overlapping causal pathways 
(normative, criminal justice, and health and social services) through which different forms of 
depenalisation, diversion and decriminalisation trigger various outcomes in combination with 
specified contexts.  
 
Foƌ eǆaŵple, the ͚gateǁaǇ effeĐt͛ is iŶĐluded iŶ the diagƌaŵ. This is because it has been suggested 
(e.g. by Kelly & Rasul, 2014) as one of the mechanisms by which reducing penalties for possessing 
one drug may increase the use and harms of other drugs. But this depends on at least two 
intervening processes occurring. One is that reducing penalties does indeed increase the use of the 
supposed gateway drug. The other is that this will increase the use of other drugs. Kelly and Rasul 
(2014) used rational addiction theory to suggest that depenalisation reduces the price of cannabis, 
so increasing use.8 But there may also be other mechanisms involved, such as neurobiological 
pƌiŵiŶg, oƌ the ͚supplǇ gateǁaǇ͛ of iŶtƌoduĐiŶg people ǁho use oŶe dƌugs to supplieƌs of otheƌs, oƌ 
common causation of use of various substances, as implicitly suggested by Otten et al (2018). And 
there may be other, counter-balancing mechanisms (such as the stigma associated with some 
͚haƌdeƌ͛ dƌugsͿ ǁhiĐh pƌeǀeŶt iŶĐƌeases in their use. Each part of the programme theory therefore 
highlights the need to deepen our understanding of each component of the complex web of 
causation, and also to observe and develop ideas on how these combine with other contexts and 
mechanisms. A useful programme theory indicates mechanisms and combinations that can be 
explored, and so suggests ways to refine and improve the theory. 
 
Realist reviews themselves exist in the domain of the empirical. They do not provide a direct 
representation of reality. A programme theory needs to be focused in order that it is not 
overwhelmed by the multiple processes and combinations which could be explored. Wong et al 
(2013) suggest creating this focus by consulting potential users of the research. We started our 
review by collecting the views of Irish policy stakeholders on the most important questions that they 
wished the review to answer. This informed our selection of the outcomes included in Figure 4. 
These are not the only potential outcomes of reducing or eliminating penalties for drug possession. 
This may also have effects on, for example, ethnic disproportionality in drug law enforcement, or on 
the legitimacy of policing in affected communities. Our omission of these outcomes exemplifies the 
inevitably political framing of drug policy research. When the findings of evidence reviews do not fit 
the political priorities of the powerful, they may be ignored (Kelly, 2018; Stevens, 2019). There is no 
possibility of creating a purely technocratic, value-free, politically neutral, ͚eǀideŶĐe-ďased͛ poliĐǇ 
(Monaghan & Boaz, 2018). 
 
Critical realist discourse analysis 
 
In addition to better understanding of the contexts and mechanisms though which drug policy 
outcomes are generated, we also need better understandings of the ways in which drug policy itself 
is produced. The tools of discourse analysis help us to do this by tracing the origins and presence of 
                                                          
8 KellǇ aŶd ‘asul͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ studǇ of the Laŵďeth ĐaŶŶaďis ǁaƌŶiŶg sĐheme provide a fascinating example of 
multi-stage causal inference at a distance. They assumed causal links from reduced penalties for cannabis 
possessioŶ iŶ a LoŶdoŶ ďoƌough to loǁeƌ pƌiĐes, to iŶĐƌeased use of ĐaŶŶaďis, to iŶĐƌeased use of ͚haƌdeƌ͛ Đlass 
A drugs, to observed increases in hospitalisations for class A drugs in that borough compared to others. But 
they did not directly observe or report data on cannabis prices, or use, or on use of class A substances. Other 
studies on the national implementation of the cannabis warning scheme disconfirmed the hypothesis of a 
causal effect in increasing cannabis use (Braakmann & Jones, 2014; Hamilton, Lloyd, Hewitt, & Godfrey, 2014). 
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particular conceptions in drug policy. But, as shown above, critical discourse analysis based on a 
radical constructionist ontology is self-defeating. There is, however, a critical realist form of 
discourse analysis (Flatschart, 2016; Sims-Schouten, Riley, & Willig, 2007). The crucial difference is 
that critical realist discourse analysis acknowledges that there is an independent reality to which 
analysed discourses may apply. It therefore becomes an important step in the analysis to identify 
relevant extra-discursive features of the field. IŶ ŵǇ aŶalǇsis of the UK goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s failuƌe to aĐt oŶ 
recommendations to reduce opioid-related deaths (Stevens, 2019), these extra-discursive features 
included: the rise in opioid-related deaths since 2012; the concentration of these deaths in 
deindustrialised working class areas; and the long project of partial state shrinkage in which the 
Conservative Party and its financial backers have engaged since the 1970s. These phenomena are 
known through empirical data that is selectively framed and imperfectly measured. But these data 
are only intelligible and refutable if we assume that they have some relation to actual events. To 
understand them, we have to explore the real underlying structures that produce these patterns of 
events. 
 
For example, in that analysis I (following Zampini, 2018) drew oŶ the ĐoŶĐept of ͚ŵoƌal fouŶdatioŶs͛ 
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) to help explain why some recommended measures have not been 
taken into UK policy. Moral foundations can be understood as underlying conceptual structures that 
iŶfoƌŵ people͛s ǀieǁs oŶ politiĐal deĐisioŶs. IŶ PaƌliaŵeŶt iŶ DeĐeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭϳ, the Prime Minister 
was asked to support drug consumption rooms on the basis of evidence from the countries where 
they have been implemented. Her reply was: 
͚I have a different opinion to some Members of this House. Some are very liberal in their 
approach to the way that drugs should be treated. I am very clear that we should recognise 
the daŵage that dƌugs do to people͛s liǀes. Ouƌ aiŵ should ďe to eŶsuƌe that people come 
off drugs, do not go on drugs in the first place and keep clear of drugs. That is what we 
should focus on͛ (May, 2017). 
 
I desĐƌiďe this as a ͚ŵoƌal sidestep͛ aǁaǇ fƌoŵ defeŶdiŶg poliĐǇ oŶ the ďasis of empirical evidence 
towards justifying it on the basis of a normative preferences. In this case, Mƌs MaǇ Đƌeates a ͚ŵoƌal 
ďouŶdaƌǇ͛ ďetǁeeŶ heƌself aŶd the ͚liďeƌals͛ ǁho suppoƌt dƌug ĐoŶsuŵptioŶ ƌooŵs. “he expressed 
the moral foundations of purity and conformity in stressing the importance of getting people to 
abstain from drugs. The analysis therefore points to the need to understand the structures and 
processes which produce moral foundations and their effects in order to deepen our understanding 
of drug policy. 
 
Other analysts may have different interpretations of Mƌs MaǇ͛s words. They might better explain the 
policy of the UK government. The point here is that in order to make this discourse intelligible for 
the purposes of drug policy analysis, we need an ontological approach that is capable of accepting 
that the events described (the words Mrs May spoke) are real (they actually occurred), that they 
refer to events that actually exist (drug-related deaths and measures to prevent them), and that 
there are real underlying mechanisms and structures that produce patterns of drug use, the related 




In this paper, I have shown that the flat ontological assumptions of both strictly successionist data 
science and radical constructionist critique cannot be sustained, either theoretically or in the 
14 
 
practice of actual studies of drug policy. This leads us to a consideration of how critical realism can 
be used to overcome these antinomies.  Critical realism is anti-foundationalist. Its claims do not arise 
from a pretended direct, empiricist access to causal law. They emerge through a combination of 
empirical research and immanent critique of other forms of representation (see Cruickshank, 2003, 
pp. 117–119). The fact that knowledge is contingent and varies between time and spaces shows us 
that we do not have direct access to understanding how things occur. But to reject the idea that 
some forms of knowledge are superior because they correspond more closely to a reality which is 
external to our research methods is to invite the paralysis of the radical constructionist position. We 
are left, therefore with the provisional, fallible ontological thesis of critical realism; that there is a 
reality external to knowledge, but our knowledge of it is inevitable provisional and fallible.  
 
Critical realist ontology encourages us to avoid making overly confident causal claims based on any 
one research method or theory. Rather, it suggests that we combine analytical forces across 
disciplines to create better understandings of the complex processes which underlie the data we 
collect. David Moore has himself participated in the type of multidisciplinary research that is needed 
to provide such deeper understandings of drug policy (Dray et al., 2012). In reflecting on this 
engagement between quantitative and qualitative methods, he suggested that some qualitative 
ƌeseaƌĐheƌs ŵight haǀe to ͚suspeŶd theiƌ theoƌetiĐal aŶd episteŵologiĐal ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts͛ (Moore, 
2011, p. 74) when doing such work. But what if we did Ŷot Ŷeed to ͚suspeŶd͛ theoƌetiĐal ǀieǁpoiŶts, 
but rather adopted a coherent ontological position which is compatible with multi-method 
collaboration? We can then avoid the self-paralysis of radical constructionism by using empirical 
data critically to produce more sophisticated and nuanced accounts. We can use these accounts 
coherently to argue for better drug policies. 
 
For quantitative researchers, the implications of a critical realist ontological approach are fourfold, 
at least. We need to combine sophisticated causal models with close observations of causal 
processes in action, rather than making assumptions about them from a distance. We should 
recognise the possibility of multiple configurations of conditions producing similar outcomes (or 
different outcomes from different combinations). This can be done by making greater use of 
interaction terms in regression analysis and of equifinal QCA methods. We should draw on a wide 
range of theoretical perspectives in developing causal hypotheses, and avoid relying on rational 
choice theory (and especially rational addiction theory) alone. And we need to be cautious in 
reporting the consistency of the associations we discover with posited causal mechanisms, rather 
than pretending to identify causal laws directly. All this should be done while recognising the 
imperfections of the data we use and that the empirical is not identical to the actual or real domains 
of reality.  
 
Critical realism provides a sound theoretical basis for producing better knowledge to use in criticising 
and improving policy (Matthews, 2014). This will require a combination of qualified constructionism 
and cautious data science in drug policy analysis. The collective effort I am calling for includes expert 
processes of ͚eǀideŶĐe-ŵakiŶg͛ (Rhodes, Lancaster, Harris, & Treloar, 2018), but it should not 
arbitrarily exclude any particular method or source. We should not limit the forms of evidence we 
consider to just those produced by highly qualified researchers using designs that aim for quasi-
experimental closure. People who use drugs are vital partners in the effort to improve knowledge on 
drug policy, as they have the necessary intimate, up-close knowledge of the events and processes 
involved. We can work together towards improved accounts through the skilled implementation of 
our continually developing methods of research, and in collaboration with people who hold other 
forms of knowledge. This will help us create provisional but increasingly useful explanations of why 
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certain forms of drug policy exist and of how they produce particular outcomes in specific contexts. 
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